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1. SUMMARY: CA9 s~ruelt aeWfl state taxes on production from 
tribal mineral leases. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: In 1887, Congress enacted the 
v General Allotment Act. Designed to facilitate speedy 
assimilation, the Act allotted parcels of land to individual 
Indians. The parcels were to be held in trust for a time · ·-
during 
CVSG-
-D~ 
I 
-~-
Indian would become the owner in fee. The Act was amended in 
1891 to permit short term leases of unallotted lands and lands 
allotted to aged and disabled allottees. Provisions for leasing 
were gradually liberalized over the years, culminating in the~ct 
of May 29, 1924. That Act allowed oil and gas production leases 
for "as long as oil or gas shall be found in paying quantities," 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to extend previous 
leases, and, most important, authorized state taxation of mineral 
production. Proceeds from the leases were paid to the Secretary 
and disbursed by congressional appropriation for the benefit of 
the Indians.l 
In the~id-30s, Congress decided that the whole allotment 
approach had been wronghead. The Indian Reorganization Act 
(IRA), passed in 1934, prohibited further allotment, returned to 
the Tribes some of the land that had passed into non-Indian 
ownership, and made provisions for tribal autonomy and authority 
lThe Act provided: 
[U]nallotted land on Indian reservations ... may be 
leased at public auction by the Secretary of the 
Interior, with the consent of the council speaking for 
such Indians, for oil and gas mining purposes for a 
period of not to exceed ten years, and as much longer 
thereafter as oil or gas shall be found in paying 
quantities, and the terms of any existing oil and gas 
mining lease may in like manner be amended by extending 
the term thereof for as long as oil or gas shall be 
found in paying quantities: Provided, That the 
production of oil and gas and other mineral on such 
lands may be taxed by the State in which said lands are 
located in all respects the same as production on 
unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of the Interior 
is hereby authorized and directed to cause to be paid 
the tax so assessed against the royalty interests on 
said lands. 
( . 
( 
-.J-
over tribal lands. After ~eral years of further debate, 
Congress passed the Act of May 11, 1938, to "bring all mineral-
leasing matters in harmony with the Indian Reorganization Act." 
The 1938 Act put in place a comprehemsive scheme for mineral 
leasing of unallotted lands. (All of resp's minerals are 
technically "unallotted lands" because the minerals were reserved 
to the United States for the benefit of the Tribe when the 
reservation land was allotted.) The Act provided for leases to 
be sold at auction to the highest bidder by the Indians 
themselves, though with the approval of the Secretary and under 
regulations issued by him. The 1938 Act did not mention 
taxation: it did repeal "all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent 
herewith." /31...~ 
Resp~as entered into 125 leases with non-Indian oil and gas -
producers. Twelve of the leases were made under the authority ·of 
the 1924 Act, the remainder pursuant to the 1938 Act. Petr (5~ej 
~~~ 
levies a variety of taxes on oil and gas produced under the 
leases. The taxes are actually paid by the lessees, who reduce 
their royalty payments to resp accordingly. There is some 
dispute over what portion, if any, of the legal incidence of the 
taxes fa~n the Tribe. 
The Montana taxes were first challenged, and eventually 
upheld, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of 
Equalization, 299 u.s. 159 (1936) (involving only the 1924 Act). 
Thereafter, the taxes were regularly assessed and paid by the 
v' 
( lessees until 1977. In that year the Solicitor of the Department 
~ of the Interior issued an opinion stating that the 1938 Act had 
I 
-4-
"replaced" the 1924 Act, and so withdrawn the authority to tax 
the mineral leases. 
~esp brought this suit challenging the Montana taxes insofar 
as they fell upon the ~be. In its answer, petr argued that the 
1924 authorization applied to :eases under the 1938 Act, and that 
in any event the sole legal incidence of the tax falls upon the 
non-Indian producers, so the Tribe is not being taxed. The DC 
(Hatfield, D. Montana) upheld the taxes on the first of these 
grounds. State taxation of Indians requires congressional 
consent; that is provided by the 1924 Act. The only question was 
whether the 1938 Act repealed that authorization. While the 1938 
Act was a comprehensive revision of the existing law, it did not 
address the issue of state taxation. There is no discussion of 
the matter in the legislative history. Something more than 
silence is necessary to support a repeal by implication. 
Moreover, from 1938 until 1977, Interior had consistently viewed 
with approval state taxation of the production of oil and gas on 
Indian lands. Its 1977 opinion ran counter to 40 years of prior 
administrative practice and congressional acquiescence. Greater 
weight was due the consistent past practice than this recent and 
sudden _~ersal. 
A panel of CA9 (Sneed, Anderson, Reinhardt (concurring in 
the result but not participating in the preparation or approval 
of the opinion)) affirmed. The necessary congressional consent 
was plainly given in the 1924 Act, and the 1938 Act did not work 
an implicit repeal. The two statutes are capable of easy 
coexistence. The legislative history does not provide the 
/ 
-5-
necessary showing of intent to repeal. Perhaps most importantly, 
there has been a longstanding administrative interpretation 
upholding the right of States to tax oil and gas production. 
Since the two statutes have "concurrent, cumulative, and 
compatible effect," the State's power to tax extends equally to 
leases entered into under the 1924 Act and those entered into 
under the 1938 Act. 
CA9 then reheard the case en bane ~d ~It 
concluded that while the 1938 Act did not repeal the 1924 Act, it 
did completely supersede it. Leases entered into pursuant to the 
earlier Act were still subject to taxation. The 1924 Act had no 
relevance to leases entered into pursuant to the 1938 Act, 
however, and production under such leases could not be taxed 
because there was no congressional authorization. The CA 
rejected petr's argument that if the 1938 Act did not repeal the 
1924 Act, it must have incorporated it. In the absence of any 
evidence in the legislative history, the court refused to believe 
"that Congress intended that part of one sentence in one of the 
statutes otherwise totally superseded by the 1938 Act be 
incorporated into the 1938 Act, and that Congress manifested its 
intention through silence." State taxation would also conflict 
with the purpose of the IRA, which was to promote "a significant 
increase in tribal autonomy ~ nd authority and the extension to 
the tribes of 'an opportunity to take over the control of their 
own resources.'" The court gave little weight to the prior 
position of the Interior Department, since it had been expressed 
( 
/ 
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only in two unpublished memoranda, not contemporaneous with the 
Act itself, and had since been repudiated. 
The dissenters agreed that the 1938 Act did not repeal the 
1924 Act: repeals by implicacion are disfavored, the two Acts are 
not inconsistent, the 1938 Act was not comprehensive, and for 40 
years the Department of the Interior thought there had been no 
repeal. Absent a repeal, the two statutes should be read 
together and full effect given to both. Since it is still in 
effect, the 1924 Act must be construed to have some force. While 
the 1938 Act replaced the leasing provisions of the 1924 Act, the ----
taxing authorization was left intact. No express incorporation 
was required; the taxing authorization applies under its own 
terms. If Congress meant to abrogate the authority to tax, it 
surely would have ~ e that intent clear. 
~~ONTENTIONS: Petr -- This is a question 
im~e that sh ld be resolved by this Court. 
of increasing 
Ninety-six 
separate actions are now pe~ding in Montana and are stayed 
pending the outcome of this case; $5 million in taxes have been 
paid under protest. Similar cases, involving $25 million, are 
pen~g in Arizona and New Mexico. ~~ 
CA9 erred on the merits.~asional references in opinions 
by this Court suggest that it views the 1924 authorization as 
still in effect. It is. Congress could have repealed the taxing 
authority but did not do so. The CA relied too heavily on its 
view of the general purposes of the IRA to inform its reading of 
the 1938 Act; the IRA really has little to do with this question. 
Other courts, including this one, have refused to look to the 
c 
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general policies underlying the IRA in construing other statutes. 
The CA should have deferred to the longstanding administrative 
interpretation. 
Resp -- The case is not ripe for review. The CA did not 
actually hold any Montana tax invalid, but remanded for a 
determination of where the legal incidence of the taxes fell. 
Most of the money at issue in Montana, and in the cases pending 
in other States, involves taxes on producers, not on the Indians, 
and therefore a decision by this Court would not affect the 
primary issue in those cases. 
The 1924 Act authorizes taxation of mineral production "on 
such lands." Those are simply the lands leased under the 1924 
statute. Solely as a matter of statutory construction, apart 
from questions of repeal, the decision below was correct because 
the 1924 authority does not extend to post-1938 leases. The 
first administrative opinion actually to consider the 
relationship between the 1924 and 1938 Acts was the one issued in 
1977. That is the only administrative decision on point and 
deserves deference. The CA properly looked to the purposes of 
the IRA for general guidance. 
By virtue of its express repealer provision, repealing "all 
Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith," the 1938 Act did 
repeal the 1924 Act. The tax consent substantially conflicts 
the 1938 Act and the IRA. 
Idaho, Nevada, N. Dakota) -- Amici point out 
vital interest" in resolution of this question, decry the 
----.:...-
( 
f 
-H-
uncertainty created by the CA's decision, and repeat some of the 
arguments made on the merits by petr. 
4. DISCUSSION: This petn raises issues that are 
s~gnificant_and becoming more so. Although litigation has not 
thus far been extensive, the issue has cropped up occasionally 
and the interest of amici indicates that it will arise more 
f tl h . . ..,.,-; h d h requen y. T e 1ssue 1s 1mportant to t e States an t e 
Indians, even if the amount of money at stake ahs been exagerated 
by petrs. On the merits, the case is difficult. See Price & 
Clinton, Law & The American Indian 804-806 (1983) (noting that 
7\} 
the "special problems" caused by t e two Actg are not 
"definitively resolved," though a "strong argument" can be made 
that the 1938 Act repealed that of 1924); Cohen's Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law 409 (1982) (pretty much treating the 1938 Act 
as a repeal on the basis of the opinion from Interior). None of 
the arguments anyone has offered are entirely convincing. 
General canons of statutory construction are not much help, and 
there is little legislative history. Where one would ordinarily 
look to plain words, there is a vacuum --"plain silence." The 
question is whether one would expect Congress to have spoken up 
if it meant for the States to be able to tax, or if it meant for 
them not to. 
/ 
The posture of the case argues against granting cert in two 
ways. First, while ~ does argue that th~effected a 
complete repeal of th it has not filed a cross-petn. 
/ The CA held tQat the 1924 Act had not been repealed and that petr 
could tax the 12 pre-1938 leases. Technically, the failure to 
/ 
-9-
cross-petn forecloses a finding that there had been complete 
repeal, which would expand the relief granted below. The Court 
remains free, however, to determine what the taxing authority 
under the 1938 Act is, and that is the heart of the dispute. 
Second, there is the question of ripeness. On remand the DC 
-~ 
might decide that the legal indidence of the tax does not fall on 
the tribe, which would moot the question whether petr can tax the 
resp directly. The taxes might still be invalid if they 
excessively impair resp's ability to govern by depriving it of 
potential revenues; thus the taxes might yet be struck down on 
other grounds. Any lack of finality is not a jurisdictional 
obstacle, however, and the legal issue is squarely presented, has 
been finally determined, and requires no factual development. I 
think the case is ripe enough. 
In light of the federal interest, the importance of the 1977 
Interior Department opinion, and the possibility that Interior's 
views have changed with the new administration, the views of the 
Solicitor General would be helpful. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend CVSG, with a view toward 
granting. 
There is a response and an amicus brief. 
August 17, 1984 Herz Opinion in petn 
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians 
No. 83-2161 
This case is here on writ of certiorari to the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The respondent/ , the 
Blackfeet Indian Tribe, filed sui~challenging the applica-
tion of e.e¥-eral Montana taxes to the Tribe's royalty inter-
~-b..~~ 
ests in oil and gas leases, ,~ssued pursuant to the Indian 
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938. 
The District Court granted 
State, holding that the taxes were authorized by 
statute. J r t held that the 1938 Act' under which these L 
1---lu/~
\ leases were issued, did ot repeal ot supersed~ ' the A~ I 
I ~t ~-r ~/tu_ .s:~ .4:> ~ J 
statu>te. ' 
~ 
~ en bane Court of Appeals reversed the District 
1 
Court. Although it agreed that the 1924 Act had not been 
I 'J.! 
repealed by the passage of the ~8 Act, the Court of Ap-
~i;., ffl~~ 
peals determined that theA1924 statute did not apply to 
1a...kr-
leases executed pursuant to the ~ Act. 
A 
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Indian tribes~ 
and individual: • Ind±a~are exempt from state taxation...J within 
their own territory unless Congress authorizes the imposi-
J 
tion of such taxes. Our cases establish that congressional - -----.,.. 
consent to state taxation of Indians must be explicitly 
clear, and that statutes are to be construed liberally in 
' .. 
2. 
favor of the Indians. The authorization in the 1924 Act was 
explicit, but this authority was omitte~~e 1938 Act. 
~lew-- "" 
Thus, the ~8 Act contains no authorization to tax the 
Tribe. 
Accordingly, we hold that Montana may not tax th~ q 
~~r. ,~~ .. J/1.4A... I 9 3d ~1-: 
Blackfeet's interests in the£e leases, ~ ~ affirm the 
1\ 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Justice White has filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Justices Rehnquist and Stevens have joined. 
l-our,; •••••••••••••••••••• 1/otea on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced .... . ........... , 19 .. . 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell March 26, 1985 
From: Lynda 
No. 83-2161 Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe (<A q ~ ~) 
Argued January 15, 1985~ ~ ~~ t.J./ z_?) 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether the State of Montana may tax the Blackfeet 
~-~
Tribe's royalty interest under oil and gas leases issued to 
non-Indian lessees pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing 
Act of 1938, 25 u.s.c. §§ 396a-396g? 
----
2. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Background 
The relevant statutory history of this case begins 
with the Act of February 28, 1891 (the "1891 Act"), codified 
at 25 u.s.c. §397, which was the first Congressional 
authorization of mineral leases involving Indian lands. 
That act authorized mineral leases for terms not to exceed 
ten years on lands "bought and paid for" by the Indians. 
The 1891 Act was amended by the Act of May 29, 1924 (the -
"1924 Act"), codified at 25 u.s.c. §398, which provided that 
Unallotted land subject to lease for 
mining purposes for a period of ten years under 
§397 . • • may be leased • • • by the Secretar of 
the Interior , wi~the cone o the Indian 
cou~ for oil--a-lid gas mining purposes for a 
perTC5a of not to exceed ten years, and as much 
longer as oil or gas shall be found in paying 
quantities, and the terms of any existing oil and 
gas mining lease may in like manner be amended by 
extending the term thereof for as long as oil or 
gas shall be found in paying quantities: 
Provided, That the p roduction of oil and gas and 
other minerals on such lands may be taxed by th f 
State in which said lands are located i n a l ~ • 
respects the same as production on unrestricted l..A-\. 
lands, and the Secretary of the Inter i or i s Jrl _· 
authorized and di rected to cause to be paid the v~ 1 
tax so assessed against the royalty Interests on L:.~ 
sa id land s: Prov i ded , however, That such tax 
shall not become a lien or charge of any kind or 
character against the land or the property of the 
Indian owner. 
The 1924 Act was enacted primarily to lengthen the terms of 
oil and gas leases, which had been fixed at ten years by the 
1891 Act. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 534 
(1982). Its noteworthy feature for purposes of this case is -------
the proviso', underlined in red, above, that permitted the 
=<!!:> t ~ o.l.l.( ' 
Sta_te to ta~in~e ..::_; c~n.E from mi~ral 
leases. Other statutes were enacted in the 1920's -
authorizing mineral leases on other types of Indian land not 
covered by the 1891 Act; these created a patchwork quilt of 
mineral leasing rules that left the law governing leases on 
tribal land in a state of confusion. Id. 
The Act of May 11, 1938 (the "1938 Act"), codified 
at 25 u.s.c. §§ 396a-396g, was enacted to remedy the 
confusion by creating comprehensive legislation governing 
-~ 
mineral leases on Indian land. The House and Senate Reports 
reflect the intent of the legislation to "obtain uniformity ---------------
so far as practicable of the law relating to the leasing of 
tribal lands for mining purposes." s. Rep. No. 985, 75th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); H.R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong. 3d 
Sess. 1 (1938). The reports also stated the hope that the 
legislation "would be a more satisfactory law for the 
leasing of Indian lands for general mining purposes. It 
will bring all mineral-leasing matters in harmony with the 
Indian Reorganization Act n S. Rep. No. 9 8 5, at 3; 
H.R. Rep. No. 1872, at 3. 
Section 1 of the 1938 Act closely tracked the 
language of the 1924 Act, in permitting mineral leasing on 
unallotted lands with the approval of the Secretary for a 
period not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as 
minerals in paying quantities were produced. Other sections 
provided uniform procedures for leasing land and protecting 
4. 
the rights of the Indians, and for the exemption of some 
reservations; the 1938 Act did not, however, contain a 
taxing provision like the 1924 Act did. Section 7 of the 
1938 Act provided that .. [a] 11 Act [sic] or parts of Acts 
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed." This case 
revolves around whether, as to leases executed after the 
.--~~
enactment of the 1938 Act, the taxing provision of the 1924 
~~
Act remained in force. ----------
B. Relevant Court Decisions and Administrative 
Interpretations 
This Court in British-American Oil Producing Co. 
v. Montana Board of Equalization, 299 u.s. 156 (1936), 
decided that the Blackfeet reservation was created by 
legislation, not by executive order, and therefore, that the 
taxing provision of the 1924 Act applied to Blackfeet land. 
INo decision of this Court has addressed interrelationship between the 1924 and 1938 Acts. the 
Several opinions of the Department of Interior are 
relevant. A l~n dealing with leases executed 
pursuant to the 1891 Act relied without qualification on 
~' . \.""\ British-American to hold that the Blackfeet were l1able for 
state taxes on royalty interests in oil and gas mining 
leases. The opinion makes no mention of the 1938 Act. 
-~ 
(Petn App., at 232.) A 1954 o2in i on also relies directly .. _.,. 
on British-American and the 1943 Dept. of Interior opinion 
to hold that the taxability question is settled. This 
---~ 
5. 
opinion does not, however, state when the leases in question 
~~ were executed, nor does 
~- solicitor who wrote the opinion knew the 1938 Act existed. 
it give any indication that the 
rY 
(Petn App., at 248.) To the same effect is a 1955 opinion ~~ 
~ ~ of the Department (Petn App., at 258.) 
~f l'f In 1956: the Department wrote an opinion finally 
'= .. 
1-t> 4 1 ~ k 1 d · -; · f h 1938 A It ruled that l l ttt:ifo ac now e g1ng t e ex1stence o t e ct. 
()v- r . the 1938 Act had no effect on the taxing provision of the 
~ 1924 Act. It held that §7 of the 1938 Act repealed only 
~~~ those acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the 1938 Act: 
~~ ~~ because that Act contained no taxing provision nor any 
J4 ":, .. ~. 
_J. ~ - mention of one, 
"r frl~ 
the 1924 taxing provision was not 
incon~tent and therefore remained in force. 
' ~ at 263, 265.) A 1J 66 ~t~ion relied on the 1956 decision. 
( Petn App., 
~~'i~~r. 
 detailed 
F~alJY , i ~ 1977~ t~Depart~ent issued a long and --
opinion that /~ver~ its earlier determination 
that the 1938 Act did not affect the taxability of Indian 
mineral leases. It concluded that British-American was 
inapposite since it was decided before 1938, and the parties 
there had stipulated that the lease involved was authorized 
under the 1891 Act and therefore, that the 1924 Act applied. 
British-American therefore had no relevance to leases 
executed after the 1938 Act was enacted. The Department 
ruled that the f ilure of the 1938 Act to mention taxation 
created an ambiguity: applying the well-established rule of - -------------construction that such ambiguities are to be construed 
liberally in favor of the Indian, the Department concluded 
~~ ~438 --;;;;~ - --
6. 
that leases executed pursuant to the 1938 Act were T notf ..____ ___ .. ____ ___ __ . ___ ·-- -.... -· --·---.....____. -------· ~----L-.. ~_j 
subject to state taxation. 
- ----- ·-· -···· - -·-· ·-- ·-·---·--·-----. 
c. Facts and Decisions Below 
After the favorable 1977 Department of Interior 
opinion, resps filed this suit in DC challenging the 
application of several Montana taxes to the Tribe's royalty 
interest in oil and gas produced on unallotted lands on the 
Tribe's reservation. The state taxes assessed against the 
Tribe's royalty interest have been paid by the lessees, who 
then deduct the amount from the Tribe's royalty payments. 
The DC granted summary judgment in favor of the State, 
ruling that the 1938 Act had not mentioned taxation, and 
repeals by implication were disfavored. The DC gave little 
weight to the 1977 Department of Interior opinion, citing 
what it considered to be the longstanding contrary 
admininstrative interpretation that the taxes were valid. 
A panel of CA9 (Sneed, Anderson, & Reinhardt) --
affirmed. On .... r~e~ ing{in ba,n~ the court (Fletcher, J.) 
reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. It --------------
concluded that the taxin been repealed by C /1- q 
the 1938 Act, but remained in effect for leases executed ---------- ~ -----------~~~---------------~ 
pursuant to the 1891 and 1924 Acts. It also concluded, 
however, that the 1938 Act did not incorporate the taxing 
-~ 
provision, and therefore, that it did not apply to leases 
ruled that although the taxing provision was consistent with 
that leases executed pursuant 
'------ - - -----
subject to state taxation. - --
c. Facts and Decisions Below 
6. 
1938 
-----
After the favorable 1977 Department of Interior 
opinion, resps filed this suit in DC challenging the 
application of several Montana taxes to the Tribe's royalty 
interest in oil and gas produced on unallotted lands on the 
Tribe's reservation. The state taxes assessed against the 
Tribe's royalty interest have been paid by the lessees, who 
then deduct the amount from the Tribe's royalty payments. 
The DC granted summary judgment in favor of the State, --
ruling that the 1938 Act had not mentioned taxation, and 
repeals by implication were disfavored. The DC gave little 
weight to the 1977 Department of Interior opinion, 
what it considered to be the longstanding 
admininstrative interpretation that the taxes were va 
A panel of CA9 (Sneed, Anderson, & Rei --
affirmed. On .... r~earing0" bajiC) the court (Fletcht 
reversed in part and remanded for further proceedin~ 
----concluded that the taxing provision had not been repealed by ~ ~ lJ 
--- --.._ -::::..__ ~ - ~ c.. rr--, 
the 1938 Act, but remained in effect for leases executed --- --~---. 
pursuant to the 1891 and 1924 Acts. It also concluded, 
~~~
however, that the 1938 Act did not incorporate the taxing 
provision, and therefore, that it did not applL to ~es 
executed after the 1938 Act was enacted. The en bane court - --------- -
ruled that although the taxing provision was consistent with 
7. 
the allotment policy in effect in 1924, it was inconsistent 
with the policies of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
("IRA"} to foster tribal sovereignty and economic growth. 
Therefore, the court ruled that Congress could not have 
intended the taxing provision to carry over to the 1938 Act, 
,..--- ~ """'-- '-- _,__ ~.
since that Act was specifically intended to harmonize with 
the IRA. The court remanded to the DC for a determination 
of where the legal incidence of the taxes fell; if it fell 
on the oil and gas producers, the DC was directed to 
determine whether the taxes were preempted. These remand 
questions are not presented in this Court. 
.......... v 
The dissent (Anderson, Wallace, 
........... 
& Kennedy} 
concurred in the majority's holding that the 1938 Act had 
not impliedly repealed the 1924 Act. The dissenters 
disagreed with the ruling that the 1924 Act's taxing 
provision was inapplicable to leases entered into pursuant 
to the 1938 Act. They argued that (i} if the 1924 Act were 
still in effect for the pre-1938 leases, as the majority 
contended, how could it have no force for leases executed 
thereafter; ( i i} the longstanding administrative 
interpretation prior to 1977 should be heeded; and (iii} if 
Congress had intended to abrogate its prior grant of taxing 
authority to the States, it would have made such an intent 
clear. 
In this Court, resp does not attack CA9's ruling 
that it must continue to pay taxes under the 1924 Act on 
8. 
royalties from leases executed prior to the enactment of the 
;;;----. 
1938 Act. 
D. Conference Votes 
At Conference, the CHIEF originally voted to 
affirm, as did JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE 
BLACKMON, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR. JUSTICES WHITE, REHNQUIST, 
and STEVENS voted to reverse. The CHIEF then changed his 
vote to pass: according to his clerk, he did so because he 
was unhappy about not voting with JUSTICE REHNQUIST on this 
case. As far as I know, the CHIEF has not cast his vote, 
although he has put it on the list with the other tied cases 
and has left it unassigned. You may draw your own 
conclusions from this. Your vote aside, I suppose the case 
has the potential for not being tied, but the CHIEF's 
treatment of the case may indicate that he is leaning toward 
voting to reverse. 
II. DISCUSSION 
This is one of those cases in which no clear 
answer exists. The 1938 Act and its legislative history are 
silent on the question of taxation: they neither expressly 
provide for taxation nor expressly prohibit it, nor do they 
acknowledge the existence of the taxing provision in the 
1924 Act. Section 7 of the 1938 Act, which repeals "all 
Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith," is ambiguous 
~ 
,~..-:; v 
tU---1-
r~­
~ 
~ 
!1!3f 
a.d 
9. 
as to whether it repeals the taxing provision. Facially, 
that provision is not inconsistent with the 1938 Act because 
there is no clause relating to taxes in that Act with which 
to conflict. On the other hand, the legislative history 
--------------~ 
makes clear that the purpose of the 1938 Act was to create a 
uniform set of rules governing mineral leasing of Indian 
lands that would be in harmony with the IRA. ________..., Retaining the ,........---... 
taxation provision from the 1924 Act arguably would be 
inconsistent with this purpose, since (i) the 1924 Act 
applied only to certain kinds of Indian lands, and (ii) the 
IRA was intended to restore Indian sovereignty and self-
sufficiency, which would be hindered by requiring the 
Indians to pay state taxes on their royalty income Neither 
way of reading the 1938 Act works smoothly. Thus, both 
sides have resorted to various canons of statutory 
construction in aid of their interpretations. 
The State contends that the 1924 Act's taxing 
provision was not repealed and therefore, must still be 
intact. It cites old cases by this Court holding that a 
clause repealing only inconsistent acts "implies very 
strongly that there may be acts on the same subject which 
are not thereby repealed," Hess v. Reynolds, 113 u.s. 73, 79 
(1885), and that such a repealer clause indicates Congress's 
intent "to leave in force some portions of former acts 
relative to the same subject matter," United States v. 
Henderson, 78 u.s. (11 Wall.) 652, 656 (1870). Congress 
knew how to repeal the taxing provision, but did not do so. 
·' 
10. 
There is a strong presumption against repeals by 
implication, ~, United States v. Borden Co., 308 u.s. 
188, 198 (1939), especially an implied repeal of a specific 
statute by a general one, Morton v. Mancari, 417 u.s. 535, 
550-551 (1974). Therefore, the State argues, the provision 
must be read as applicable to leases under the 1938 Act. --- -----~ 
StJ- &--~ 
The SG and resp argue to the contrary that other _____ , --'""-"----....-"'---""'--- ____________.___ 
~ rules of interpretation govern. First, resp argues that the 
~~ taxing proviso was not repealed, but replaced by the 1938 
Act for leases execu.teq after the later act's enactment. 
Thus the canons of construction cited by the State are 
..... 
inapplicable here. Second, the SG observes that it is well 
------------~ ~ 
established that Congress's consent to the state taxation of --- ---~---------- ~---.... 
Indians will be found <2.!!1-Y if manifested by the clearest 
intent. ~' Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 u.s. 373, 392-393 
~-(1976). Congress has never given a blanket authorization 
for taxation of Indians' income--even from unallotted lands; 
the 1924 Act, for instance, permitted taxation of income 
from land leased for mining, but not for grazing purposes. 
The 1937 Quapaw Act, which contains an explicit and limited 
consent to tax, demonstrates that the same Congress that 
enacted the 1938 Act knew such consents must be 
affirmatively and clearly stated to be effective. Exemption 
from taxation has long been regarded as a principal aspect 
of Indian sovereignty; any departure this principle ---would be a radical one, and such a result should not be 
inferred from Congress's silence. At the very least, the 
11. 
1938 Act is ambiguous as to whether the taxing provision 
carries over. This Court has long held that ambiguities 
such as these are to be resolved in favor of the Indian, 
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 u.s. 363, 367 (1930), and, the SG 
contends, that principle applies here. 
Moreover, the SG argues, the way the 1938 Act was 
-- --=--
drafted indicates that Congress intended to eliminate the --------- ~~taxing pro~n. The Act was intended to be comprehensive 
,.---..__ -
concerning the leasing of unallotted lands, as reflected by 
the fact that §1 refers to what shall "hereafter" be 
permitted. Sections 1 and 2 replaced the substantive 
leasing provisions of the 1924 Act: the tax clause had been 
only a proviso to the substantive provision, and Congress 
did not include it. Likewise, the new §§1 and 2 in the 1938 
Act were closely patterned after the language of the 1924 
Act and incorporated several aspects of that Act, yet the 
taxing provision was eliminated. These factors strongly 
suggest that Congress knowingly replaced the 1924 Act with 
the 1938 Act and deliberately omitted the tax consent • ._ 
Both sides, of course, advance other arguments in 
favor of their positions. The State contends that CA9 erred 
in overlooking the longstanding administrative 
interpretation that the taxing provision remained in force. 
The State contends that the Department of Interior had a 
"consistent practice of over forty years" of authorizing 
States to collect the taxes in question, and the 
Department's 1977 opinion was a "bolt out of the blue" that 
.1-'· 
should be given no deference. There was no change in the 
statute that would prompt such a change in viewpoint. 
Moreover, the State has been collecting the applicable taxes 
throughout the years, and neither the Indians nor the oil 
and gas producers challenged them until 1976. 
As CA9 and resp point out, however, the 
administrative record is not so strongly consistent as the ~ 
State contends. The opinions prior to 1956 made no mention - ------------------------------of the 1938 Act or to leases executed pursuant thereto. The 
most that can be said about these opinions is that they did 
not address the issue presented by this case, but assumed 
that the 1924 Act and this Court's decision in British-
American applied. The 1956 opinion of the Department of 
Interior, however, did address the question whether the 
taxing provision had been repealed by the 1938 Act and held 
that it had not. A 1966 opinion relied on the 1956 
issuance. In 1977, the Department reconsidered the issue 
carefully and in more detail than it had in 1956, and 
reversed its prior decision. 
that the Department had a 
although it unquestionably 
It is hard, therefore, to say { 
consistent 40-year practice, 
reversed itself with the 1977 
opinion. The 1977 opinion deserves some weight, however, 
because it appears to have been much more thorough and 
carefully considered than the 1956 opinion. 
The State considers that CA9 erred in looking to 
trends, policies, and legislative goals relating to the IRA, 
instead of to the statute and how it had been consistently 
13. 
applied and interpreted. CA9's use of the policies 
underlying the IRA to interpret the 1938 Act was error, the 
State argues, because the IRA does not deal with the 
taxation of minerals or royalty income. CA9 exercised 
functions reserved to legislators, as questions of tax 
immunities--especially concerning Indians--are "essentially 
legislative in nature." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 
411 u.s. 145, 150 (1973). The State contends that CA9's 
only correct statement about the IRA was that it was 
intended to eliminate the allotment system and provide for 
reacquisition of lands by the tribes. CA9's inference that 
the taxing provisions of the 1924 Act should therefore fall 
is nothing but unfounded speculation unsupported either by 
the language of the IRA or its legislative history. In 
fact, Congress had rejected earlier versions of the IRA that 
provided for broad immunities for the Indians from state and 
local taxes. This supports instead the inference that 
Congress intended for the 1924 Act provision to stand. 
The State is correct that much of CA9's reliance 
on perceived goals of the IRA and how those goals affected 
Congress's intent as to the 1938 Act is pure speculation. 
On the other hand, the House and Senate Reports, as quoted 
supra, Part !.A., at 3, do state that Congress wished to 
bring the mineral leasing laws in harmony with the purposes 
of the IRA. The SG persuasively points out that statutes 
permitting state taxation of Indian income from mineral 
leasing were an integral part of the allotment policy 
repudiated by the IRA. The allotm~nt policy was intended to 
assimilate the Indians into American society; this was to be 
accomplished by the eventual passage of unallotted Indian 
land into non-Indian hands and under the full taxing 
jurisdiction of the State. The taxing provision of the 1924 
Act and similar acts of that time was intended to make the 
revenue available to the State during the transition period. 
At the same time, taxing power was not given over allotted 
lands leased for mining purposes, because these lands were 
intended to remain in Indian hands, and thus, forever beyond 
the taxing power of the State. This allotment policy was 
repudiated by the IRA in 1934, removing the expectation that 
the unallotted lands would pass into non-Indian hands. The 
justification for allowing States to tax unallotted lands 
was also thereby eliminated, and thus, having no taxing 
provision in the 1938 Act was consistent with IRA policy. 
This is reflected by §5 of the IRA, which provides that 
lands acquired by the United States in trust for the Indians 
"shall be exempt from state and local taxation." The SG 
also argues that retaining the taxing provision would have 
been inconsistent with the IRA's goal of rehabilitating the 
Indians' economic life and giving them control over their 
oon affairs and property. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, supra, 411 u.s., at 152-153. 
The sum total of all of this is that the statute 
and the legislative history do not address the problem. I 
15. 
found the SG's brief most persuasive, and am inclined to 
recommend that you vote to affirm. This Court's cases are 
clear that Congress's intent to permit taxation of Indians - ~ -·~ -----------·- -..__. --·--
must be clear, and that ambiguities must be resolved in --~
favor of the Indians. Given the ambiguity in the statute 
here and the lack of evidence in the legislative history, I 
believe that those well-established principles of Indian law 
should govern, notwithstanding the fact that the practice of 
collecting taxes from the Indians continued for years after 
the 1938 Act was passed. I therefore recommend that you 
vote to affirm. 
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Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians 
No. 83-2161 
First Draft 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the State 
of Montana may tax the Blackfeet Tribe's royalty interests 
under oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees 
2. 
pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 
198, 52 Stat. 347, 25 u.s.c. §396a et seq. 
I 
Respondent Blackfeet Tribe filed this suit in the 
United States District Court for the District of Montana 
challenging the application of several Montana taxes 1 to 
the Tribe's royalty interest in oil and gas produced under 
leases issued by the Tribe. The leases involved 
' v 
unallotted lands on the Tribe's reservations and were 
granted to non-Indian lessees in accordance with the 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 
1At issue are the taxes adopted in the following 
statutes: the Oil and Gas Severance Tax, Mont. Code Ann. 
§§15-36-101 et seq. (1983); the Oil and Gas Net Proceeds 
Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§15-23-601 et seq.; the Oil and Gas 
Conservati n Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§82-11-101 et seq.; and 
the Resou ce Indemnity Trust Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§15-38-
101 et se • 
3. 
25 u.s.c. §396a et seq. ~here-af--te-r,. the 1938 Act]. The ./ 
taxes at issue were paid to the State by the lessees and 
then deducted by the lessees from the royalty payments 
made to the Tribe. The Blackfeet sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief against enforcement of the state tax 
statutes. 2 The Tribe argued to the District Court that 
the 1938 Act did not authorize the State to tax tribal 
royalty interests and thus that the taxes were unlawful. 
2The Blackfeet properly invoked the jurisdiction of 
the district court pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §1362, which 
provides: 
"The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by 
any Indian tribe or band with a governing body 
duly recong ized by the Secretary of the 
Interior, wherein the matter in controversy 
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States." 
As we held in Moe v. & Kootenai Tribes, 425 u.s. 
463 (1976), a suit an Indian tribe to enjoin the 
enforcement of state tax laws is cognizable in the 
district court under §1362 despite the general sar ~aa~ 
~ :iii · ::::::~g;n 28 u.s.c. §1341. See ~ at 474-475. 
~ ~~ l4:>-s<J.s., 
-IN\~ l.l5C ~ /3'-/} 
~ ~ ~ lJiUt)a.tj~  
~ ~~·ovv:> 1 ~ ltU.05 . 
4. 
The District Court rejected this claim and granted the 
State's motion for summary judgment. The court held that 
the state taxes were authorized by a 1924 statute, Act of 
May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 u.s.c. 
§398 [~ a4:tex: ~e 1924 Act], and that the 1938 Act, 
under which the leases in question were issued, did not 
repeal this authorization. The District Court was not 
persuaded by a 1977 opinion of the Department of the 
Interior supporting the Blackfeet's position, citing 
contrary views taken earlier by the Executive Branch. 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed in 
part and remanded the case for further proceedings. 729 
F.2d 1192 (1984). The court held that the tax 
5. 
authorization in the 1924 Act was not repealed by the 1938 
Act and thus remained in effect for leases executed 
pursuant to the 1924 Act. The court also held, however, 
that the 1938 Act did not incorporate the tax 
author izatioR provision of the 1924 Act, and therefore 
/, 
that the authorization did not apply to leases executed 
after the enactment of the 1938 Act. The court reasoned 
that the taxing provision of the 1924 Act was inconsistent 
with the policies of the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 u.s.c. §461 et seq. 
{hereafte.~:)J:!-LIRA] . 
A 
Since the 1938 Act was adopted 
specifically to harmonize Indian leasing laws with the 
IRA, Congress could not have intended it to apply to 
leases issued under the 1938 Act. The court remanded the 
case to the District Court to determine where the legal 
6. 
incidence of the taxes fell, and directed the court to 
consider whether, if the taxes fell on the oil and gas 
producers instead of the Indians, the taxes were preempted 
by federal law. We granted the State's petition for 
certiorari to resolve whether Montana may tax Indian 
royalty interests arising out of leases executed after the 
adoption of the 1938 Act. u.s. (1984). We affirm 
the decision of the en bane Court of Appeals that it may 
not. 
II 
Congress first authorized mineral leasing of 
ch . 3i.5 J d6 61AX . 1'{5" 
Indian lands in the Act of Feb. 28, 189l,~codified at 25 
u.s.c. §397 [her~qfter The Act authorized 
leases for terms not to exceed ten years on lands "bought 
7. 
and paid for" by the Indians. The 1891 Act was amended in 
1924. The amendment provided in pertinent part: 
. ·· ~ 
Unallot ed land subject to lease for 
mining pu poses for a period of ten years under 
§397 • • • may be leased • • . by the SecretarY., 
f th ~ erior, with the consent of the [Indianj 
for oil and gas mining purposes for a 
per 10 f not to exceed ten years, and as much 
longer as oil or gas shall be found in paying 
quanti ties, and the terms of any existing oil 
and gas mining lease may in like manner be 
amended by extending the term thereof for as 
long as oil or gas shall be found in paying 
quantities: Provided, That the production of 
oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may 
be taxed by the State in which said lands are 
located in all respects the same as production 
on unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of the 
Interior is authorized and directed to cause to 
be paid the tax so assessed against the royalty 
interests on said lands: Provided, however, 
That such tax shall not become a lien or charge 
of any kind or character against the land or the 
property of the Indian owner. Act of May 29, 
1924, j codified at 25 u.s.c. §398. 
~ ~3 SkU . ;Jl/~) 
I 
Montana relies on the first proviso in the 1924 Act in 
claiming the authority to tax the Blackfeet's royalty 
payments. 
In 1938, Congress adopted comprehensive 
legislation in an effort to "obtain uniformity so far as 
8. 
practicable of the law relating to the leasing of tribal 
lands for mining purposes." S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong. , 
lSI 'fl 
~ Sess. A (1938). Like the 1924 Act, the 1938 Act 
permitted, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior, mineral leasing of unallotted lands for a period 
not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals 
in paying quantities were produced. The Act also detailed 
uniform leasing procedures designed to protect the 
Indians. See 25 u.s.c. §§396b-396g. The 1938 Act did not 
contain a provision authorizing state taxation; nor did it 
repeal specifically the authorization in the 1924 Act. A 
general repealer clause was provided in section 7 of the 
Act: "All Act [sic] or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith 
are hereby repealed." The question presented by this 
case is whether the 1924 Act's proviso that authorizes 
9. 
state taxation was repealed by the 1938 Act, or if left 
intact, applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act. 
III 
The Constitution vests the Federal Government with 
exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes. 
Art. I, § 8, cl.3; see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of 
Oneida, 414 u.s. 661, 670 (1974), citing Worcester v. 
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561 (1832) • As a corollary of this 
authority, and in recognition of the sovereignty retained 
by Indian tribes even after formation of the United 
States, Indian tribes and individuals generally are exempt 
from state taxation within their own territory. In The 
Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737~(1866), for example, the 
Court held that lands held by Indians in common as well as 
those held in severalty were exempt from state taxation. 
10. 
It explained that "[i]f the tribal organization • • is 
preserved intact, and recognized by the political 
department of the government as existing, then they are a 
'people distinct from others,' separated from the 
jurisdiction of [the State], and to be governed 
rd · ~ cd- 75'r. 
~
exclusively by the government of the Union." in 
The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 ,-=110, 110 (1866), the 
Court characterized the State's attempt to tax Indian 
reservation land as ~raordinary,~ 
'Jd · t.Vf 7£0 I _, 
"illegal" exercise 
of state power, and "an unwarrantable interference, 
inconsistent with the original title of the Indians, and 
·,d · I a.f 77/ • 
offensive to their tribal relations) " As the Solicitor 
General points out, this ~rt has never waivered from the 
views expressed in these cases. See, e. g. , Bryan v. 
Itasca County, 426 u.s. 373, 375-378, 392-393 (1976); Moe 
v. 
11. 
s~ 
oJ-
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S ) ~ 
4 75-4 76 ) il976)a...., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 u.s. 
145, 148 (1973). 
In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian 
affairs, Congress can authorize the imposition of state 
taxes on Indian tribes and individual Indians. It has not 
done so often, and the Court consistently has 
held that it will find the Indians' exemption from state 
taxes lifted only when Congress has made its intention to 
supra, 
~~ 
aes-ohrtely clear. E. g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 
~ .1\ 
a~-393, Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 u.s. 363, 366-367 
do so 
(1930). The 1924 Act contains such an explicit 
authorization. As a result, in British-American Oil 
~ 
Produc~ Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 u.s. 159 
(1936) , the Court held that the State of Montana could tax 
12. 
oil and gas produced under leases executed under the 1924 
Act. 3 
The State urges us that the taxing authorization 
provided in the 1924 Act applies to leases executed under 
the 1938 Act as well. It argues that nothing in the 1938 
Act is inconsistent with the 1924 taxing provision and 
thus that the provision was not repealed by the 1938 Act. 
It cites decisions of this Court that a clause repealing 
only inconsistent acts "implies very strongly that there 
may be acts on the same subject which are not thereby 
repealed," Hess v. Reynolds, 113 u.s. 73, 79 (1885), and 
3 In British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of 
Equalization, 299 u.s. 159 (1936), the Court interpreted 
the statutory leasing authority over lands "bought and 
acquired by the Indians" to include land reserved for the 
Indians in exchange for their cession or surrender of 
other lands or rights, as well as that acquired by Indians 
for money. 
13. 
that such a clause indicates Congress' intent "to leave in 
force some portions of former acts relative to the same 
subject- matter," United States v. Henderson, 11 Wall. 652, 
A 
656 (1870). The State also notes that there is a strong 
presumption against repeals by implication, e. g., United 
States v. Borden Co., 308 u.s. 188, 198 (1939), especially 
A 
an implied repeal of a specific statute by a general on:J 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 u.s. 535, 550-551 (1974). Thus, in 
the State's view, sound principles of statutory 
construction lead to the conclusion that its taxing 
authority under the 1924 Act remains intact. 
The State fails to appreciate, however, that the 
standard ~tory construction do not have their 
"' 
usual force in cases involving Indian law. As we said 
earlier this Term, "[t]he canons of construction 
14. 
applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust 
relationship between the United States and the Indians." 
Oneida County, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation, u.s. 
--' (1985). Two such canons are directly applicable 
in this case: first, the States may tax Indians only when 
Congress has manifested 
taxation, e. g., Bryan 
clearly its consent to 
v. Itasca County~:~at 
such 
393; 
second, statutes are to be ~ iberallYS construed~n favor of 
the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to 
their benefit, e. g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commn., 411 u.s. 164, 174 (1973); Choate v. Trapp, 224 
u.s. 665, 675 (1912). 4 When the 1924 and 1938 Acts are 
4Indeed, the Court has held that although tax 
exemptions generally are to be construed narrowly, in "the 
Government's dealings with the Indians, the rule is 
exactly the contrr r . The construction, instead of being 
strict, is libera . • . " Choate v. Trapp, 224 u.s. 665, 
675 (1912). 
~:;~ight of these principles, it is 
"" 
15. 
clear that 
the 1924 Act does not authorize Montana to enforce its tax 
statutes with respect to leases issued under the 1938 Act. 
IV 
Nothing in either the text or legislative history 
of the 1938 Act suggests that Congress intended to permit 
States to tax tribal royalty income generated by leases 
issued pursuant to that Act. The statute contains no 
explicit consent to state taxation. Nor is there any 
indication that Congress intended to incorporate 
implicitly in the 1938 Act the taxing authority of the 
1924 Act. 5 Contrary to the State's suggestion, under the 
5 In fact, the legislative history suggests that 
Congress intended to replace the 1924 Act's leasing scheme 
with that of the 1938 Act. As the Court of Appeals 
recognized, Congress had three major goals in adopting the 
1938 Act: (}') to achieve "uniformity so far as practicable 
~· Footnote continued on next page. 
j ~) 
~) 
16. 
applicable principles of statutory construction, the 
general repealer clause of the 1938 Act cannot be taken to 
incorporate consistent provisions of earlier laws. The 
clause surely does not satisfy the requirement that 
Congress clearly consent to state taxation. Nor would the 
State's interpretation satisfy the rule requiring that 
statutes be contrued liberally in favor of the Indians. 
Moreover, the language of the taxing provision of 
-tev:t.r-
the 1924 Act belies any suggestion bRA~ by its owH terms, 
it carries over to the 1938 Act. 6 The tax proviso in the 
of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for 
mining purposes," S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 
2 (1937): (2} to "bring all mineral~leasing matters in 
harmony with the Indian Reorganization Act)' [Act of June 
~ lgJ4 1 25 tl.S.C. S49l Qt seq ]~ S. Rep./ No. 985, 
supra, at 3: H.R. Rep. No. 1872, ac ~ and (~) to ensure 
that Indians receive "the gr test return from their 
property." s. Rep. 985, sur , at 2; H.R. Rep. 1872, 
supra, at 2. As the Court o Appeals these 
purposes would be undermin d if the were 
Footnote conti ued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 6 will ppear on following pages. 
~je;.Jed. 
75 #... ~ . , 3&. S.,s.s . "3. (!9 38 2 
17. 
1924 Act states that "the production of oil and gas and 
other minerals on such lands may be taxed by the State in 
which said lands are located II 25 u.s.c. §398. 
Even applying ordinary principles of statutory 
construction, "such lands" refers to •fi/nallotted land •• 
subject to lease for mining purposes • • under §397 
[the 1891 Act] • " Ibid. When the statute is "liberally 
construed • • in favor of the Indians," Alaska Pacific 
Fisheries v. United States, 248 u.s. 78, 89 (1918), it is 
clear that if the tax proviso survives at all, it reaches 
~ 
interpreted to incorporate ~he tax~tion proviso of the 
1924 ~ct. See 729 F.2d 1193 19 -1198 (~ 1984). 
The Court of Appeals el that the 1938 Act did 
not repeal implicitly the 1924 onsent to state taxation 
and thus that this consent conti ues in force with respect 
to leases issued under the 1924 or 1891 Acts. 729 F.2d, 
at 1200. Because the Blackfeet have not sought review on 
this question, we need not de ide whether the Court of 
~peals was correct. We assume for purposes of this case 
that the 1924 Act's authorization remains in effect for 
leases executed pursuant to that statute. 
18. 
only those leases executed under the 1891 Act and its 1924 
amendment. 7 
v 
In the absence of clear congressional consent to 
l ~ 4 c-s;;:Gi .. sEK ""'f 
7we are likewise unpersuaded by the State's 
contention that we should defer to the longstanding 
administrative interpretation that the 1924 taxing proviso 
applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act. The State 
relies on various op1n1ons of the Department of the 
Interior in making this argument. As the Court of Appeals 
pointed out, how,iever, the administrative record is not~ a--
strongly consistent as the State contends. 729 F. 2d, at 
1202-1203. The opinions issued prior to 1956 did not 
mention the 1938 Act or leases executed pursuant thereto. 
Thus, at best, they did not address the issue presented by 
this case, but simply assumed that the 1924 Act and this 
Court's decision in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. 
oar o qua 1za , i!99 u.s. 159 (19J6) ?( applied to 
leases executed under the 1938 Act. It was not until its 
1956 opinion that the Department of Interior considered 
the relationship between the 1938 and 1924 Acts. The 
Department then held that the taxing provision had not 
been repealed by the 1938 Act. This 1956 opirt~9n was 
un ubli ed and did not analyze whether CongressAinlended 
the 1924 provision to apply to leases entered 't4~P..der the 
1938 Act. A 1966 opinion relied on the 1956 is~uance. In 
1977, the Department reconsidered the issue carefully and 
in far~  detail than it had in 1956, and reversed its 
prior decision. See 729 F.2d, at 1202-1203. On this 
record, i accept the premise of the State's 
argument for defere e to agency interpretation, that is, 
that the had a consistent 40-year practice. 
~~~~~~~~~z:_ ____ .-/ 
~ 
7A--u ~ /2-~~~ ~ ~ 
I.a..,_ A'!tl!,~, ~ ~~---~~ ~ 
~ ~ ~~~7....-LkOOZ'"~~ _ ~~ 
~~~~-r_/-~ . .L. 
~"-~; rLo ~. ~-y 
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taxation, we hold that the State may not tax Indian 
royalty income from leases issued pursuant to the 1938 
Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
~ · · ~.
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BLACKFEET TRIBE OF INDIANS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the State of Mon-
tana may tax the Blackfeet Tribe's royalty interests under oil 
and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees pursuant to the 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 25 
U.S. C. §396aetseq. 
I 
Respondent Blackfeet Tribe filed this suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of Montana challenging 
the application of several Montana ta)\es 1 to the Tribe's roy-
alty interest in oil and gas produced under leases issued by 
the Tribe. The leases involved unallotted lands on the 
Tribe's reservations and were granted to non-Indian lessees 
in accordance with the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 
ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347,25 U. S. C. §396a et seq. (the 1938 Act). 
The taxes at issue were paid to the State by the lessees and 
then deducted by the lessees from the royalty payments 
made to the Tribe. The Blackfeet sought declaratory and in-
1 At issue are the taxes adopted in the following statutes: the Oil and Gas 
Severance Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-36-101 et seq. (1983); the Oil and 
Gas Net Proceeds Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-23-601 et seq. (1983); the 
Oil and Gas Conservation Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§82-11-101 et seq.; and 
the Resource Indemnity Trust Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-38-101 et seq. 
(1983). 
2.. 
g 
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junctive relief against enforcement of the state tax statutes. 2 
The Tribe argued to the District Court that the 1938 Act did 
not authorize the State to tax tribal royalty interests and 
thus that the taxes were unlawful. The District Court re-
jected this claim and granted the State's motion for summary 
judgment. The court held that the state taxes were author-
ized by a 1924 statute, Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 
244, codified at 25 U. S. C. § 398 (the 1924 Act), and that the 
1938 Act, under which the leases in question were issued, did 
not repeal this authorization. The District Court was not 
persuaded by a 1977 opinion of the Department of the Inte-
rior supporting the Blackfeet's position, citing contrary views 
taken earlier by the Executive Branch. c; 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. On re-
hearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 729 F . 2d 1192 
(1984). The court held that the tax authorization in the 1924 
Act was not repealed by the 1938 Act and thus remained in 
effect for leases executed pursuant to the 1924 Act. The 
court also held, however, that the 1938 Act did not incorpo-
rate the tax provision of the 1924 Act, and therefore that its 
authorization did not apply to leases executed after the enact-
ment of the 1938 Act. The court reasoned that the taxing 
provision of the 1924 Act was inconsistent with the policies of 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 
2 The Blackfeet properly invoked the jurisd.iction of the district court 
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1362, whieh provides: 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, 
brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recongized 
by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 
As we held in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), a suit 
by an Indian tribe to enjoin the enforcement of state tax laws is cognizable 
in the district court under § 1362 despite the general ban in 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1341 against seeking federal injunctions of such laws. See id., at 
474-475. 
, ., . 
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25 U. S. C. §461 et seq. (the IRA). Since the 1938 Act was 
adopted specifically to harmonize Indian leasing laws with 
the IRA, Congress could not have intended it to apply to 
leases issued under the 1938 Act. The court remanded the 
case to the District Court to determine where the legal inci-
dence of the taxes fell, and directed the court to consider 
whether, if the taxes fell on the oil and gas producers instead 
of the Indians, the taxes were preempted by federal law. 
We granted the State's petition for certiorari to resolve 
whether Montana may tax Indian royalty interests arising 
out of leases executed after the adoption of the 1938 Act. 
-- U. S. -- (1984). We affirm the decision of the en 
bane Court of Appeals that it may not. 
II 
Congress first authorized mineral leasing of Indian lands in 
the Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, 26 Stat. 795, codified at 25 
U. S. C. § 397 (the 1891 Act). The Act authorized leases for 
terms not to exceed ten years on lands "bought and paid for" 
by the Indians. The 1891 Act was amended in 1924. The 
amendment provided in pertinent part: 
Unallotted land ... subject to lease for mining pur-
poses for a period of ten years under § 397 . . . may be 
leased ... by the Secretary of the Interior, with the con-
sent of the [Indian] council . . . , for oil and gas mining 
purposes for a period of not to exceed ten years, and as 
much longer as oil or gas shall be ~ound in paying quanti-
ties, and the terms of any existfug oil and gas mining 
lease may in like manner be amended by extending the 
term thereof for as long as oil or gas shall be found in 
paying quantities: Provided, That the production of oil 
and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed 
by the State in which said lands are located in all re-
spects the same as production on unrestricted lands, and 
the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed 
to cause to be paid the tax so assessed against the roy-
,•. 
4 
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alty interests on said lands: Provided, however, That 
such tax shall not become a lien or charge of any kind or 
character against the land or the property of the Indian 
owner. Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codi-
fied at 25 U. S. C. § 398. 
Montana relies on the first proviso in the 1924 Act in claiming 
the authority to tax the Blackfeet's royalty payments. 
In 1938, Congress adopted comprehensive legislation in an 
effort to "obtain uniformity so far as practicable of the law 
relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes." 
S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1938). Like the 
1924 Act, the 1938 Act permitted, subject to the approval of 
the Secretary of the Interior, mineral leasing of unallotted 
lands for a period not to exceed ten years and as long there-
after as minerals in paying quantities were produced. The 
Act also detailed uniform leasing procedures designed to pro-
tect the Indians. See 25 U. S. C. §§396b-396g. The 1938 
Act did not contain a provision authorizing state taxation; nor 
did it repeal specifically the authorization in the 1924 Act. A 
general repealer clause was provided in section 7 of the Act: 
"All Act [sic] or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are 
hereby repealed." The question presented by this case is 
whether the 1924 Act's proviso that authorizes state taxation 
was repealed by the 1938 Act, or if left intact, applies to 
leases executed under the 1938 Act. 
III 
The Constitution vests the Federaf Government with ex-
clusive authority over relations with Indian tribes. Art. I, 
§ 8, cl.3; see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 
U. S. 661, 670 (1974), citing Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 
561 (1832). As a corollary of this authority, and in recogni-
tion of the sovereignty retained by Indian tribes even after 
formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals 
generally are exempt from state taxation within their own 
territory. In The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1866), for 
,•. 
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example, the Court ruled that lands held by Indians in com-
mon as well as those held in severalty were exempt from 
state taxation. It explained that "[i]f the tribal organization 
... is preserved intact, and recognized by the political de-
partment of the government as existing, then they are a 'peo-
ple distinct from others,' ... separated from the jurisdiction 
of [the State], and to be governed exclusively by the govern-
ment of the Union." Id., at 755. Likewise, in The New 
York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 (1866), the Court characterized the 
State's attempt to tax Indian reservation land as extraordi-
nary, an "illegal" exercise of state power, id., at 770, and "an 
unwarrantable interference, inconsistent with the original 
title of the Indians, and offensive to their tribal relations," 
id., at 771. As the Solicitor General points out, this Court 
has never waivered from the views expressed in these cases. 
See, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 375-378, 
392-393 (1976); Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 
463, 475-476 (1976); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
u. s. 145, 148 (1973). 
In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian affairs, 
Congress can authorize the imposition of state taxes on In-
dian tribes and individual Indians. It has not done so often, 
and the Court consistently has held that it will find the Indi-
ans' exemption from state taxes lifted only when Congress 
has made its intention to do so unmistakeably clear. E. g., 
Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, at 392-393; Carpenter v. 
Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 366-367 (1930). ~ The 1924 Act contains 
such an explicit authorization. As a result, in British-Amer-
ican Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 
159 (1936), the Court held that the State of Montana could tax 
oil and gas produced under leases executed under the 1924 
Act. 3 
8 In British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 
U. S. 159 (1936), the Court interpreted the statutory leasing authority 
over lands "bought and acquired by the Indians" to include land reserved 
, •. 
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The State urges us that the taxing authorization provided 
in the 1924 Act applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act 
as well. It argues that nothing in the 1938 Act is inconsist-
ent with the 1924 taxing provision and thus that the provision 
was not repealed by the 1938 Act. It cites decisions of this 
Court that a clause repealing only inconsistent acts "implies 
very strongly that there may be acts on the same subject 
which are not thereby repealed," Hess v. Reynolds, 113 
U. S. 73, 79 (1885), and that such a clause indicates Congress' 
intent "to leave in force some portions of former acts relative 
to the same subject-matter," United States v. Henderson, 11 
Wall. 652, 656 (1870). The State also notes that there is a 
strong presumption against repeals by implication, e. g., 
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198 (1939), espe-
cially an implied repeal of a specific statute by a general one, 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550-551 (1974). Thus, in 
the State's view, sound principles of statutory construction 
lead to the conclusion that its taxing authority under the 1924 
Act remains intact. 
The State fails to appreciate, however, that the standard 
principles of statutory construction do not have their usual 
force in cases involving Indian law. ~s we said earlier this 
Term, "[t]he canons of construction applicable in Indian law 
are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the 
United States and the Indians." Oneida County, New York 
v. Oneida Indian Nation, -- U. S. --, --. (1985). 
Two such canons are directly applicabl~ in this case: first, the 
States may tax Indians only when Congress has manifested 
clearly its consent to such taxation, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca 
County, supra, at 393; second, statutes are to be construed 
liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions 
interpreted to their benefit, e. g., McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Commn., 411 U. S. 164, 174 (1973); Choate v. 
for the Indians in exchange for their cession or surrender of other lands or 
rights, as well as that acquired by Indians for money. 
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Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 675 (1912). 4 When the 1924 and 1938 
Acts are considered in light of these principles, it is clear that 
the 1924 Act does not authorize Montana to enforce its tax 
statutes with respect to leases issued under the 1938 Act. 
IV 
Nothing in either the text or legislative history of the 1938 
Act suggests that Congress intended to pennit States to tax 
tribal royalty income generated by leases issued pursuant to 
that Act. The statute contains no explicit consent to state 
taxation. Nor is there any indication that Congress in-
tended to incorporate implicitly in the 1938 Act the taxing 
authority of the 1924 Act. 5 Contrary to the State's sugges-
tion, under the applicable principles of statutory construc-
tion, the general repealer clause of the 1938 Act cannot be 
taken to incorporate consistent provisions of earlier laws. 
The clause surely does not satisfy the requirement that Con-
gress clearly consent to state taxation. Nor would the 
State's interpretation satisfy the rule requiring that statutes 
be contrued liberally in favor of the Indians. 
• Indeed, the Court has held that although tax exemptions generally are 
to be construed narrowly, in ''the Government's dealings with the Indians, 
the rule is exactly the contrary. The construction, instead of being strict, 
is liberal ... . "Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 675 (1912). 
5 In fact, the legislative history suggests that Congress inteoded to re-
place the 1924 Act's leasing scheme with that of the 1938 Act. As the 
Court of Appeals recognized, Congress had three major goals in adopting 
the 1938 Act: (i) to achieve "uniformity so far as practicable of the law re-
lating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes," S. Rep. No. 985, 
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); H. R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 
(1938); (ii) to "bring all mineral-leasing matters in harmony with the Indian 
Reorganization Act," S. Rep. No. 985, supra, at 3; H. R. Rep. No. 1872, 
supra, at 3; and (iii) to ensure that Indians receive "the greatest return 
from their property." S. Rep. 985, supra, at 2; H. R. Rep. 1872, supra, at 
2. As the Court of Appeals suggested, these purposes would be under-
mined if the 1938 Act were interpreted to incorporate the taxation proviso 
of the 1924 Act. See 729 F. 2d 1193, 1196-1198 (CA9 1984). 
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Moreover, the language of the taxing provision of the 1924 
Act belies any suggestion that it carries over to the 1938 
Act. 6 The tax proviso in the 1924 Act states that "the pro-
duction of oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may 
be taxed by the State in which said lands are located . . . . " 
25 U. S. C. § 398. Even applying ordinary principles of stat-
utory construction, "such lands" refers to "[ u]nallotted land 
... subject to lease for mining purposes ... under§ 397 [the 
1891 Act]." Ibid. When the statute is "liberally construed 
. . . in favor of the Indians," Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. 
United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918), it is clear that if the 
tax proviso survives at all, it reaches only those leases exe-
cuted under the 1891 Act and its 1924 amendment. 7 
8 The Court of Appeals held that the 1938 Act did not repeal implicitly 
the 1924 consent to state taxation and thus that this consent continues in 
force with respect to leases issued under the 1924 or 1891 Acts. 729 F. 2d, 
at 1200. Because the Blackfeet have not sought review on this question, 
we need not decide whether the Court of Appeals was correct. We as-
sume for purposes of this case that the 1924 Act's authorization remains in 
effect for leases executed pursuant to that statute. 
7 We are likewise unpersuaded by the State's contention that we should 
defer to the JssssiaDdiRg administrative interpretation that the 1924 tax-
ing proviso applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act. The State re-
lies on 'IZal'ietts opinions of the Department of the Interior in making this 
argument. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, however, the adminis-
trative record is not as strongly consistent as the State contends. 729 F. 
2d, at 1202-1203. The opinions issued prior to 1956 did not mention the 
1938 Act or leases executed pursuant thereto. ' Thus, at best, they did not 
address the issue presented by this case, but simply assumed that the 1924 
Act and this Court's decision in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. 
Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159 (1936), applied to leases executed 
under the 1938 Act. It was not until its 1956 opinion that the Department 
of Interior considered the relationship between the 1938 and 1924 Acts. 
The Department then held that the taxing provision had not been repealed 
by the 1938 Act. This 1956 opinion was unpublished and did not analyze 
whether Congress had intended the 1924 Act's provision to apply to leases 
entered under the 1938 Act. A 1966 opinion relied on the 1956 opinion. 
In 1977, the Department reconsidered the issue carefully and in far greater 
,•. 
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v 
In the absence of clear congressional consent to taxation, 
we hold that the State may not tax Indian royalty income 
from leases issued pursuant to the 1938 Act. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
detail than it had in 1956, and reversed its prior decision. See 729 F. 2d, 
at 1202-1203. On this record, we cannot accept the premise of the State's 
argument for deference to agency interpretation, that is, that the Depart-
ment had a consistent 40-year practice. This is particularly true where, as 
here, the language and purpose of the 1938 Act are-for the reasons set 
forth above-dearly to the contrary. 
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SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-2161 
MONTANA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. BLACKFEET 
TRIBE OF INDIANS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1985] 
JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the State of Mon-
tana may tax the Blackfeet Tribe's royalty interests under oil 
and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees pursuant to the 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 25 
U. S. C. §396a et seq. (1938 Act). 
I 
Respondent Blackfeet Tribe filed this suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of Montana challenging 
the application of several Montana taxes 1 to the Tribe's roy-
alty interests in oil and gas produced under leases issued by 
the Tribe. The leases involved unallotted lands on the 
Tribe's reservation and were granted to non-Indian lessees in 
accordance with the 1938 Act. The taxes at issue were paid 
to the State by the lessees and then deducted by the lessees 
from the royalty payments made to the Tribe. The Black-
feet sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforce-
1 At issue are the taxes adopted in the following statutes: the Oil and Gas 
Severance Tax, Mont. Code Ann. § 15-36-101 et seq. (1983); Oil and Gas 
Net Proceeds, Mont. Code Ann. § 15-23-601 et seq. (1983); Oil and Gas 
Conservation, Mont. Code Ann. § 82-11-101 et seq. (1983); and the Re-
source Indemnity Trust Tax, Mont. Code Ann. § 15-38-101 et seq. (1983). 
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ment of the state tax statutes. 2 The Trib~ argued to the 
District Court that the 1938 Act did not authorize the State 
to tax tribal royalty interests and thus that the taxes were 
unlawful. The District Court rejected this claim and 
granted the State's motion for summary judgment. The 
court held that the state taxes were authorized by a 1924 
statute, Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 
25 U. S. C. § 398 (1924 Act), and that the 1938 Act, under 
which the leases in question were issued, did not repeal this 
authorization. The District Court was not persuaded by a 
1977 opinion of the Department of the Interior supporting the 
Blackfeet's position, noting that the Department previously 
had expressed contrary views, 507 F. Supp. 446, 451 (1981). 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. On re-
hearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 729 F. 2d 1192 
(1984). The court held that the tax authorization in the 1924 
Act was not repealed by the 1938 Act and thus remained in 
effect for leases executed pursuant to the 1924 Act. The 
court also held, however, that the 1938 Act did not incorpo-
rate the tax provision of the 1924 Act, and therefore that its 
authorization did not apply to leases executed after the enact-
ment of the 1938 Act. The court reasoned that the taxing 
provision of the 1924 Act was inconsistent with the policies of 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 
2 The Blackfeet properly invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court 
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1362, which provides: 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, 
brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized 
by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 
As we ruled in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), a 
suit by an Indian tribe to enjoin the enforcement of state tax laws is cogni-
zable in the district court under § 1362 despite the general ban in 28 
U. S. C. § 1341 against seeking federal injunctions of such laws. See id., 
at 474-475. 
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U. S. C. §461 et seq. (IRA). Since the 1938 Act was 
adopted specifically to harmonize Indian leasing laws with 
the IRA, Congress could not have intended the 1924 Act to 
apply to leases issued under the 1938 Act. The court re-
manded the case to the District Court to determine where 
the legal incidence of the taxes fell, and directed the court to 
consider whether, if the taxes fell on the oil and gas produc-
ers instead of the Indians, the taxes were preempted by fed-
eral law. We granted the State's petition for certiorari to 
resolve whether Montana may tax Indian royalty interests 
arising out of leases executed after the adoption of the 1938 
Act. 469 U. S. - (1984). We affirm the decision of the 
en bane Court of Appeals that it may not. 
II 
Congress first authorized mineral leasing of Indian lands in 
the Act of Feb. 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, codified at 25 U. S. C. 
§ 3.97 (the 1891 Act). The Act authorized leases for terms 
not to exceed 10 years on lands "bought and paid for" by the 
Indians. The 1891 Act was amended by the 1924 Act. The 
amendment provided in pertinent part: 
"Unallotted land ... subject to lease for mining pur-
poses for a period of ten years under section 397 . . . may 
be leased . . . by the Secretary of the Interior, with the 
consent of the [Indian] council . . . , for oil and gas min-
ing purposes for a period of not to exceed ten years, and 
as much longer as oil or gas shall be found in paying 
quantities, and the terms of any existing oil and gas min-
ing lease may in like manner be amended by extending 
the term thereof for as long as oil or gas shall be found in 
paying quantities: Provided, That the production of oil 
and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed 
by the State in which said lands are located in all re-
spects the same as production on unrestricted lands, and 
the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed 
to cause to be paid the tax so assessed against the roy-
4 
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alty interests on said lands: Provided, however, That 
such tax shall not become a lien or charge of any kind or 
character against the land or the property of the Indian 
owner." Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codi-
fied at 25 U. S. C. § 398. 
Montana relies on the first proviso in the 1924 Act in claiming 
the authority to tax the Blackfeet's royalty payments. 
In 1938, Congress adopted comprehensive legislation in an 
effort to "obtain uniformity so far as practicable of the law 
relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes." 
S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937) (hereafter 
Senate Report). Like the 1924 Act, the 1938 Act permitted, 
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, min-
eral leasing of unallotted lands for a period not to exceed 10 
years and as long thereafter as minerals in paying quantities 
were produced. The Act also detailed uniform leasing proce-
dures designed to protect the Indians. See 25 U. S. C. 
§§ 396b-396g. The 1938 Act did not contain a provision au-
thorizing state taxation; nor did it repeal specifically the au-
thorization in the 1924 Act. A general repealer clause was 
provided in § 7 of the Act: "All Act [sic] or parts of Acts in-
consistent herewith are hereby repealed." The question 
presented by this case is whether the 1924 Act's proviso that 
authorizes state taxation was repealed by the 1938 Act, or if 
left intact, applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act. 
III 
The Constitution vests the Federal Government with ex-
clusive authority over relations with Indian tribes. Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3; see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 
U. S. 661, 670 (1974), citing Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 
561 (1832). As a corollary of this authority, and in recogni-
tion of the sovereignty retained by Indian tribes even after 
formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals 
generally are exempt from state taxation within their own 
territory. In The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867), for 
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example, the Court ruled that lands held by Indians in com-
mon as well as those held in severalty were exempt from 
state taxation. It explained that "[i]f the tribal organization 
... is preserved intact, and recognized by the political de-
partment of the government as existing, then they are a 'peo-
ple distinct from others,' ... separated from the jurisdiction 
of [the State], and to be governed exclusively by the govern-
ment of the Union." !d., at 755. Likewise, in The New . 
York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 (1867), the Court characterized the 
State's attempt to tax Indian reservation land as extraordi-
nary, an "illegal" exercise of state power, id., at 770, and "an 
unwarrantable interference, inconsistent with the original 
title of the Indians, and offensive to their tribal relations," 
id., at 771. As the Solicitor General points out, this Court 
has never wavered from the views expressed in these cases. 
See, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 375-378, 
392-393 (1976); Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 
463, 475-476 (1976); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
u. s. 145, 148 (1973). 
In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian affairs, 
Congress can authorize the imposition of state taxes on In-
dian tribes and individual Indians. It has not done so often, 
and the Court consistently has held that it will find the Indi-
ans' exemption from state taxes lifted only when Congress 
has made its intention to do so unmistakably clear. E. g., 
Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, at 392-393; Carpenter v. 
Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 366-367 (1930). The 1924 Act contains 
such an explicit authorization. As a result, in British-Amer-
ican Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 
159 (1936), the Court held that the State of Montana could tax 
oil and gas produced under leases executed under the 1924 
Act. 3 
3 In British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, the 
Court interpreted the statutory leasing authority over lands "bought and 
paid for by the Indians" to include land reserved for the Indians in ex-
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The State urges us that the taxing authorization provided 
in the 1924 Act applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act 
as well. It argues that nothing in the 1938 Act is inconsist-
ent with the 1924 taxing provision and thus that the provision 
was not repealed by the 1938 Act. It cites decisions of this 
Court that a clause repealing only inconsistent acts "implies 
very strongly that there may be acts on the same subject 
which are not thereby repealed," Hess v. Reynolds, 113 
U. S. 73, 79 (1885), and that such a clause indicates Congress' 
intent "to leave in force some portions of former acts relative 
to the same subject-matter," Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall. 
652, 656 (1871). The State also notes that there is a strong 
presumption against repeals by implication, e. g., United 
States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198 (1939), especially an 
implied repeal of a specific statute by a general one, Morton 
v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550-551 (1974). Thus, in the 
State's view, sound principles of statutory construction lead 
to the conclusion that its taxing authority under the 1924 Act 
remains intact. 
The State fails to appreciate, however, that the standard 
principles of statutory construction do not have their usual 
force in cases involving Indian law. As we said earlier this 
Term, "[t]he canons of construction applicable in Indian law 
are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the 
United States and the Indians." Oneida County v. Oneida 
Indian Nation, 470 U.S.--,-- (1985). Two such can-
ons are directly applicable in this case: first, the States may 
tax Indians only when Congress has manifested clearly its 
consent to such taxation, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 
supra, at 393; second, statutes are to be construed liberally in 
favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted 
to their benefit, e. g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 174 (1973); Choate v. Trapp, 224 
change for their cession or surrender of other lands or rights, as well as 
that acquired by Indians for money. 
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U. S. 665, 675 (1912). 4 When the 1924 and 1938 Acts are 
considered in light of these principles, it is clear that the 1924 
Act does not authorize Montana to enforce its tax statutes 
with respect to leases issued under the 1938 Act. 
IV 
Nothing in either the text or legislative history of the 1938 
Act suggests that Congress intended to permit States to tax 
tribal royalty income generated by leases issued pursuant to 
that Act. The statute contains no explicit consent to state 
taxation. Nor is there any indication that Congress in-
tended to incorporate implicitly in the 1938 Act the taxing 
authority of the 1924 Act. 5 Contrary to the State's sugges-
tion, under the applicable principles of statutory construc-
tion, the general repealer clause of the 1938 Act cannot be 
taken to incorporate consistent provisions of earlier laws. 
The Clause surely does not satisfy the requirement that Con-
gress clearly consent to state taxation. Nor would the 
State's interpretation satisfy the rule requiring that statutes 
be construed liberally in favor of the Indians. 
' Indeed, the Court has held that although tax exemptions generally are 
to be construed narrowly, in "the Government's dealings with the Indians 
the rule is exactly the contrary. The construction, instead of being strict, 
is liberal ... . "Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S., at 675. 
5 In fact, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to re-
place the 1924 Act's leasing scheme with that of the 1938 Act. As the 
Court of Appeals recognized, Congress had three major goals in adopting 
the 1938 Act: (i) to achieve "uniformity so far as practicable of the law re-
lating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes," Senate Report 2; 
H. R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1938); (ii) to "bring all min-
eral-leasing matters in harmony with the Indian Reorganization Act," Sen-
ate Report 3; H. R. Rep. No. 1872, supra, at 3; and (iii) to ensure that Indi-
ans receive "the greatest return from their property." Senate Report 2; 
H. R. Rep. No. 1872, supra, at 2. As the Court of Appeals suggested, 
these purposes would be undermined if the 1938 Act were interpreted to 
incorporate the taxation proviso of the 1924 Act. See 729 F. 2d 1192, 
1196-1198 (CA9 1984). 
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Moreover, the language of the taxing provision of the 1924 
Act belies any suggestion that it carries over to the 1938 
Act. 6 The tax proviso in the 1924 Act states that "the pro-
duction of oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may 
be taxed by the State in which said lands are located . . . . " 
25 U. S. C. § 398. Even applying ordinary principles of stat-
utory construction, "such lands" refers to "[ u]nallotted land 
... subject to lease for mining purposes ... under section 
397 [the 1891 Act]." When the statute is "liberally con-
strued ... in favor of the Indians," Alaska Pacific Fisheries 
v. United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918), it is clear that if the 
tax proviso survives at all, it reaches only those leases exe-
cuted under the 1891 Act and its 1924 amendment. 7 
6 The Court of Appeals held that the 1938 Act did not repeal implicitly 
the 1924 consent to state taxation and thus that this consent continues in 
force with respect to leases issued under the 1924 or 1891 Acts. 729 F. 2d, 
at 1200. Because the Blackfeet have not sought review on this question, 
we need not decide whether the Court of Appeals was correct. We as-
sume for purposes of this case that the 1924 Act's authorization remains in 
effect for leases executed pursuant to that statute. 
7 We are likewise unpersuaded by the State's contention that we should 
defer to the administrative interpretation that the 1924 taxing proviso ap-
plies to leases executed under the 1938 Act. The State relies on opinions 
of the Department of the Interior in making this argument. As the Court 
of Appeals pointed out, however, the administrative record is not as 
strongly consistent as the State contends. 729 F. 2d, at 1202-1203. The 
opinions issued prior to 1956 did not mention the 1938 Act or leases exe-
cuted pursuant thereto. Thus, at best, they did not address the issue pre-
sented by this case, but simply assumed that the 1924 Act and this Court's 
decision in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 
299 U. S. 159 (1936), applied to leases executed under the 1938 Act. It 
was not until its 1956 opinion that the Department of Interior considered 
the relationship between the 1938 and 1924 Acts. The Department then 
held that the taxing provision had not been repealed by the 1938 Act. 
This 1956 opinion was unpublished and did not analyze whether Congress 
had intended the 1924 Act's provision to apply to leases entered pursuant 
to the 1938 Act. A 1966 opinion relied on the 1956 opinion. In 1977, the 
Department reconsidered the issue carefully and in far greater detail than 
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In the absence of clear congressional consent to taxation, 
we hold that the State may not tax Indian royalty income 
from leases issued pursuant to the 1938 Act. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
it had in 1956, and reversed its prior decision. See 729 F. 2d, at 
1202-1203. On this record, we cannot accept the premise of the State's 
argument for deference to agency interpretation, that is, that the Depart-
ment had a consistent 40-year practice. This is particularly true where, as 
here, the language and purpose of the 1938 Act are--for the reasons set 
forth above--clearly to the contrary. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-2161 
MONTANA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. BLACKFEET 
TRIBE OF INDIANS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1985] 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
The question is whether the proviso to the Act of May 29, 
1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 U. S. C. § 398, 
authorizes a State to tax oil and gas production under leases 
entered into under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 
ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, codified at 25 U. S. C. §396a-396g. In 
my view, the proviso constitutes a sufficiently explicit ex-
pression of congressional intent to permit such taxation. 
The majority apparently does not rest its contrary holding 
on the conclusion that the 1938 Act repealed the taxing au-
thority contained in the 1924 Act. See ante, at 8, and n. 6. 
Although the majority d~ not a:epea!:. to come to rest O]! the 
question whether the taxin roviso has been re ealed, it is 
clear to me (as it was to both the majority and the dissent in 
the Court of Appeals) that the 1938 Act did ·not rei:?eal the 
proviso. The 1938 Act repealed Orily acts inconsi~ent with 
its terms, see ch. 198, § 1, 52 Stat. 347, and there is no sug-
gestion that taxation of mineral leases is actually inconsistent 
with any of the provisions of the 1938 Act. Indeed, given 
that the 1938 Act and its legislative history are completely 
silent on the question of taxation, it cannot seriously be 
suggested that the 1938 Act specifically repealed any taxing 
authority that might otherwise exist under·the 1924 Act. 
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The question thus boils down to whether the taxing pro-
viso, by its terms, ap lies to leases un er the 1938 Act.* 
The answeriD.USt be sought in the terms of the proviso itself. 
The majority concludes that the 1924 Act cannot be read to 
apply to leases under the 1938 Act. I must disagree. 
The proviso to the 1924 Act states that "the production of 
oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by 
the State in which said lands are located in all respects the 
same as production on unrestricted lands" (emphasis added). 
The permission to tax in the• proviso depends only on the 
character of the lands on which production takes place; ac-
cordingly, the dispositive question here is whether the lands 
the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938 Act are "such 
lands" within the meaning of the proviso. 
The phrase "such lands" in the proviso refers to 
"[ u]nallotted land on Indian reservations other than lands of 
the Five Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject 
to lease for mining purposes for a period of ten years under 
the proviso to section 3 of the Act of February 28, 1891 [ch. 
383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795]." The 1891 Act, now codified at 25 
U. S. C. § 397, allowed mineral leasing of "lands . . . occupied 
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same, and which 
lands are not needed for farming or agricultural purposes, 
and are not desired for individual allotments." Thus, the 
proviso by its express terms applies to unallotted lands on In-
dian reservations "bought and paid for" by the Indians and 
not needed for agricultural purposes. 
The lands that the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938 
Act clearly fall within this description: they are unallotted 
*The majority frames the question as whether the 1938 Act "incorpo-
rates" the proviso to the 1924 Act. See ante, at 7. To me, the discussion 
of "incorporation" seems beside the point. The 1924 proviso remains on 
the books, and it covers leases of a certain description. The question is 
whether leases under the 1938 Act fit that description. If they do, a spe-
cific congressional intent to "incorporate" the proviso into the 1938 Act is 
unnecessary. 
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reservation lands not needed for agricultural purposes. 
Moreover, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board 
of Equalization of the State of Montana, 299 U. S. 159 
(1936), this Court held that the Blackfeet Reservation was 
"bought and paid for" within the meaning of the proviso-
that is, the reservation is the product of an agreement by 
which the Blackfeet gave up certain rights in exchange for 
the reservation. See id., at 162-164. Because the leases 
are located "on such lands" as are described by the 1924 pro-
viso, I can only conclude that the taxation of oil and gas 
production under the leases is expressly authorized by the 
proviso and is therefore lawful. 
In so concluding, I a mindful of the general rule th stat-
ut are be liberally construe in avor of Indian tribes. 
But more to the point, to my way of thinking, is the proposi-
tion that this rule is no more than a canon of construction, 
and "[a] canon of construction is not a license to disregard 
clear expressions of . . . congressional intent." Rice v. 
Rehner, 463 U. S. --', --. (1983). The proviso to the 
19 Act is a clear expression of c n essional intent to allow 
the States to tax mmeral pro uction under eases of lands de-
scribed in the Act; the proviso has never been repealed; and 
the lands that the Blackfeet-have leased under the 1938 Act 
fall within the proviso's description of lands on which mineral 
production is subject to taxation. 
Respondents suggest, and the majority seems to agree, see 
ante, at 7, n. 5, that this result is to be avoided because State 
taxation of mineral production on leaseholds created under 
the 1938 Act is somehow contrary to the "policy" of the 1938 
Act. The relevant policies seem to have been promoting uni-
formity in the law governing tribal authority to enter into 
mineral leases, preserving the independence of Indian tribes, 
and guaranteeing the tribes a fair return on properties leased 
for mineral production. But it is far from clear that Con-
gress saw State taxation of mineral production to be a threat 
to-either of these goals; as the majority concedes, the legisla-
4YlV 
83-2161-DISSENT 
4 MONTANA v. BLACKFEET TRIBE 
tive history is barren of any indication that taxation by the 
States was one of the evils Congress sought to eradicate 
through the 1938 Act. This omission is particularly striking 
given that at the time the statute was under consideration, 
this Court had just handed down its ruling in British-Ameri-
can Oil Co., supra, which held that production on leases lo-
cated on reservations created by treaty or legislation was 
subject to State taxation under the proviso to the 1924 Act. 
To me, the absence of any comment in the legislative history 
pertaining to State taxation confirms that we should give ef-
fect to the express language of the 1924 proviso authorizing 
the State taxes at issue here. 
Finally, I consider it relevant, though not dispositive, that 
the suggestion that the 1924 Act does not authorize taxation 
of production on 1938 Act leases is contrary to the interpreta-
tion of both acts that apparently prevailed in the De artment 
oft e nterior until 1977. Op1mons Issue y t e Office ·of 
the ~Interior in the years following the passage 
of the 1938 Act discussed the scope of State authority to tax 
under the proviso to the 1924 Act with no mention of the pos-
sibility that the 1938 Act had had any effect on such author-
ity. See 58 Interior Dec. 535 (1943); Opinion of the Depart-
ment of Interior, M-36246, Oc~29, ~; Opinion of the 
Department of Interior, M-36310, Oct. 13, 1955. In 1956, --
the Department issued an opinion explicitly ~eluding that 
the 1924 proviso applied to leases under the 1938 Act, and the 
Department reaffirmed this position in 1966. See Opinion of 
the Department of Interior, M-36345, 1\faY 4, 1956; Letter 
from Harry R. Anderson, Ass't. Secretary of the Interior, 
Oct. 27, 1966, reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. A-301. 
Not until 1977 did the Department change its view of the 
effect of the 1938 Act on the taxation authority contained in 
the proviso. This hi~ admittedly does not conclusively 
es~ what the Department's position was at the time of 
the passage of the 1938 Act and in the years immediately fol-
lowing. Still, it is significant that it was not until years after 
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the passage of the 1938 Act that the Department first sug-
gested that the 1924 proviso's explicit authorization of tax-
ation did not extend to leases under the 1938 Act. Had Con-
gress really intended to cut off the State's authority to tax 
mineral production on all leases entered into after 1938, it 
would seem odd that no one in the Interior Department was 
aware of this intention. 
Because the proviso to the 1924 Act explicitly authorizes 
State taxation of mineral production on "such lands" as are 
concerned in this case, and because nothing in the language of 
the 1938 Act, its legislative history, its underlying policies, or 
its administrative construction suggests that the express lan-
guage of the proviso should not govern this case, I would hold 
that the State taxes at issue here are authorized by federal 
law. 
I therefore dissent. 
1st DRAFT 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice Marshall 
Justice Blackmun 
Justice Powell 
Justice Rehnquist 
Justice Stevens 
Justice O'Connor 
From: Justice White 
Circulated: MAY 2 4 1965 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-2161 
MONTANA, ET AL. , PETITIONERS v. BLACKFEET 
TRIBE OF INDIANS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1985] 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
The question is whether the proviso to the Act of May 29, 
1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 U. S. C. § 398, 
authorizes a State to tax oil and gas production under leases 
entered into under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 
ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, codified at 25 U. S. C. § 396a-396g. In 
my view, the proviso constitutes a sufficiently explicit ex-
pression of congressional intent to permit such taxation. 
The majority apparently does not rest its contrary holding 
on the conclusion that the 1938 Act repealed the taxing au-
thority contained in the 1924 Act. See ante, at 8, and n. 6. 
Although the majority does not appear to come to rest on the 
question whether the taxing proviso has been repealed, it is 
clear to me (as it was to both the majority and the dissent in 
the Court of Appeals) that the 1938 Act did not repeal the 
proviso. The 1938 Act repealed only acts inconsistent with 
its terms, see ch. 198, § 7, 52 Stat. 347, and there is no sug-
gestion that taxation of mineral leases is actually inconsistent 
with any of the provisions of the 1938 Act. Indeed, given 
that the 1938 Act and its legislative history are completely 
silent on the question of taxation, it cannot seriously be 
suggested that the 1938 Act specifically repealed any taxing 
authority that might otherwise exist under·the 1924 Act. 
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The question thus boils down to whether the taxing pro-
viso, by its terms, applies to leases under the 1938 Act.* 
The answer must be sought in the terms of the proviso itself. 
The majority concludes that the 1924 Act cannot be read to 
apply to leases under the 1938 Act. I must disagree. 
The proviso to the 1924 Act states that "the production of 
oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by 
the State in which said lands are located in all respects the 
same as production on unrestricted lands" (emphasis added). 
The permission to tax in the• proviso depends only on the 
character of the lands on which production takes place; ac-
cordingly, the dispositive question here is whether the lands 
the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938 Act are "such 
lands" within the meaning of the proviso. 
The phrase "such lands" in the proviso refers to 
"[ u]nallotted land on Indian reservations other than lands of 
the Five Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject 
to le.ase for mining purposes for a period of ten years under 
the proviso to section 3 of the Act of February 28, 1891 [ch. 
383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795]." The 1891 Act, now codified at 25 
U. S. C. § 397, allowed mineral leasing of "lands ... occupied 
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same, and which 
lands are not needed for farming or agricultural purposes, 
and are not desired for individual allotments." Thus, the 
proviso by its express terms applies to unallotted lands on In-
dian reservations "bought and paid for" by the Indians and 
not needed for agricultural purposes. 
The lands that the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938 
Act clearly fall within this description: they are unallotted 
*The majority frames the question as whether the 1938 Act "incorpo-
rates" the proviso to the 1924 Act. See ante, at 7. To me, the discussion 
of "incorporation" seems beside the point. The 1924 proviso remains on 
the books, and it covers leases of a certain description. The question is 
whether leases under the 1938 Act fit that description. If they do, a spe-
cific congressional intent to "incorporate" the proviso into the 1938 Act is 
unnecessary. 
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reservation lands not needed for agricultural purposes. 
Moreover, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board 
of Equalization of the State of Montana, 299 U. S. 159 
(1936), this Court held that the Blackfeet Reservation was 
"bought and paid for" within the meaning of the provis~ 
that is, the reservation is the product of an agreement by 
which the Blackfeet gave up certain rights in exchange for 
the reservation. See id., at 162-164. Because the leases 
are located "on such lands" as are described by the 1924 pro-
viso, I can only conclude that the taxation of oil and gas 
production under the leases is expressly authorized by the 
proviso and is therefore lawful. 
In so concluding, I am mindful of the general rule that stat-
utes are to be liberally construed in favor of Indian tribes. 
But more to the point, to my way of thinking, is the proposi-
tion that this rule is no more than a canon of construction, 
and "[a] canon of construction is not a license to disregard 
clear expressions of . . . congressional intent .. " Rice v. 
Rehner, 463 U.S. --, --. (1983). The proviso to the 
1924 Act is a clear expression of congressional intent to allow 
the States to tax mineral production under leases of lands de-
scribed in the Act; the proviso has never been repealed; and 
the lands that the Blackfeet 'have leased under the 1938 Act 
fall within the proviso's description of lands on which mineral 
production is subject to taxation. 
Respondents suggest, and the majority seems to agree, see 
ante, at 7, n. 5, that this result is to be avoided because State 
taxation of mineral production on leaseholds created under 
the 1938 Act is somehow contrary to the "policy" of the 1938 
Act. The relevant policies seem to have been promoting uni-
formity in the law governing tribal authority to enter into 
mineral leases, preserving the independence of Indian tribes, 
and guaranteeing the tribes a fair return on properties leased 
for mineral production. But it is far from clear that Con-
gress saw State taxation of mineral production to be a threat 
to-either of these goals; as the majority concedes, the legisla-
o.r.y 
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tive history is barren of any indication that taxation by the 
States was one of the evils Congress sought to eradicate 
through the 1938 Act. This omission is particularly striking 
given that at the time the statute was under consideration, 
this Court had just handed down its ruling in British-Ameri-
can Oil Co., supra, which held that production on leases lo-
cated on reservations created by treaty or legislation was 
subject to State taxation under the proviso to the 1924 Act. 
To me, the absence of any comment in the legislative history 
pertaining to State taxation confirms that we should give ef-
fect to the express language of the 1924 proviso authorizing 
the State taxes at issue here. 
Finally, I consider it relevant, though not dispositive, that 
the suggestion that the 1924 Act does not authorize taxation 
of production on 1938 Act leases is contrary to the interpreta-
tion of both acts that apparently prevailed in the Department 
of the Interior until 1977. Opinions issued by the Office of 
the Solicitor of the Interior in the years following the passage 
of the 1938 Act discussed the scope of State authority to tax 
under the proviso to the 1924 Act with no mention of the pos-
sibility that the 1938 Act had had any effect on such author-
ity. See 58 Interior Dec. 5Q5 (1943); Opinion of the Depart-
ment of Interior, M-36246, Oct. 29, 1954; Opinion of the 
Department of Interior, M-36310, Oct. 13, 1955. In 1956, 
the Department issued an opinion explicitly concluding that 
the 1924 proviso applied to leases under the 1938 Act, and the 
Department reaffirmed this position in 1966. See Opinion of 
the Department of Interior, M-36345, May 4, 1956; Letter 
from Harry R. Anderson, Ass't. Secretary of the Interior, 
Oct. 27, 1966, reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. A-301. 
Not until 1977 did the Department change its view of the 
effect of the 1938 Act on the taxation authority contained in 
the proviso. This history admittedly does not conclusively 
establish what the Department's position was at the time of 
the passage of the 1938 Act and in the years immediately fol-
lowing. Still, it is significant that it was not until years after 
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the passage of the 1938 Act that the Department first sug-
gested that the 1924 proviso's explicit authorization of tax-
ation did not extend to leases under the 1938 Act. Had Con-
gress really intended to cut off the State's authority to tax 
mineral production on all leases entered into after 1938, it 
would seem odd that no one in the Interior Department was 
aware of this intention. 
Because the proviso to the 1924 Act explicitly authorizes 
State taxation of mineral production on "such lands" as are 
concerned in this case, and because nothing in the language of 
the 1938 Act, its legislative history, its underlying policies, or 
its administrative construction suggests that the express lan-
guage of the proviso should not govern this case, I would hold 
that the State taxes at issue here are authorized by federal 
law. 
I therefore dissent. 
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The 1891 Act that first authorized mineral leasing of Indian lands was 
amended by a 1924 Act that provided that "the production of oil and gas 
and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by the State in which said 
lands are located." The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, which was 
enacted to obtain uniformity of Indian mineral leasing laws, also per-
mitted mineral leasing of Indian lands, but contained no provision au-
thorizing state taxation nor did it repeal specifically such authorization 
in the 1924 Act. A general repealer clause of the 1938 Act, however, 
provides that "[a]ll Act[s] or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are 
hereby repealed." Respondent Indian Tribe filed suit in Federal Dis-
trict Court challenging the application of several Montana taxes to re-
spondent's royalty interests under oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian 
lessees pursuant to the 1938 Act, and seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief. The District Court granted summary judgment for the State, 
holding that the taxes were authorized by the 1924 Act and that the 1938 
Act did not repeal this authorization. The Court of Appeals reversed in 
pertinent part. 
Held: Montana may not tax respondent's royalty interests from leases is-
sued pursuant to the 1938 Act. Pp. 4-9. 
(a) Two canons of statutory construction apply to this case: the States 
may tax Indians only when Congress has manifested clearly its consent 
to such taxation, and statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of 
Indians. Pp. 4-7. 
(b) When the 1924 and 1938 Acts are considered in light of these prin-
ciples, it is clear that the 1924 Act does not authorize Montana to impose 
the taxes in question. Nothing in either the text or legislative history of 
the 1938 Act suggests that Congress intended to permit States to tax 
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tribal royalty income generated by leases issued pursuant to that Act. 
The Act contains no explicit consent to state taxation nor is there any 
indication that it was intended to incorporate implicitly the 1924 Act's 
taxing aut)lority. The 1938 Act's general repealer clause cannot be 
taken to incorporate consistent provisions of earlier Jaws and surely does 
not satisfy the requirement that Congress clearly consent to state tax-
ation. Moreover, the language of the 1924 Act's taxing provision belies 
any suggestion that it carries over to the 1938 Act, since the words "such 
lands" in the taxing provision refer to lands subject to mineral leases 
under the 1891 Act and its 1924 amendment. Pp. 7-8. 
729 F. 2d 1192, affirmed. 
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. 
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST and STEVENS, 
JJ., joined. 
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JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and Jus- ( 
TICE STEVENS join, dissenting. 
The question is whether the proviso to the Act of May 29, 
1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 U. S. C. §398, 
authorizes a State to tax oil and gas production under leases 
entered into under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 
ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, codified at 25 U. S. C. §396a-396g. In 
my view, the proviso constitutes a sufficiently explicit ex-
pression of congressional intent to permit such taxation. 
The majority apparently does not rest its contrary holding 
on the conclusion that the 1938 Act repealed the taxing au-
thority contained in the 1924 Act. See ante, at 8, and n. 6. 
Although the majority does not appear to come to rest on the 
question whether the taxing proviso has been repealed, it is 
clear to me (as it was to both the majority and the dissent in 
the Court of Appeals) that the 1938 Act did not repeal the 
proviso. The 1938 Act repealed only acts inconsistent with 
its terms, see ch. 198, § 7, 52 Stat. 347, and there is no sug-
gestion that taxation of mineral leases is actually inconsistent 
with any of the provisions of the 1938 Act. Indeed, given 
that the 1938 Act and its legislative history are completely 
silent on the question of taxation, it cannot seriously be 
suggested that the 1938 Act specifically repealed any taxing 
authority that might otherwise exist under the 1924 Act. 
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The question thus boils down to whether the taxing pro-
viso, by its terms, applies to leases under the 1938 Act.* 
The answer must be sought in the terms of the proviso itself. 
The majority concludes that the 1924 Act cannot be read to 
apply to leases under the 1938 Act. I must disagree. 
The proviso to the 1924 Act states that "the production of 
oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by 
the State in which said lands are located in all respects the 
same as production on unrestricted lands" (emphasis added). 
The permission to tax in the proviso depends only on the 
character of the lands on which production takes place; ac-
cordingly, the dispositive question here is whether the lands 
the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938 Act are "such 
lands" within the meaning of the proviso. 
The phrase "such lands" in the proviso refers to 
"[u]nallotted land on Indian reservations other than lands of 
the Five Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject 
to lease for mining purposes for a period of ten years under 
the proviso to section 3 of the Act of February 28, 1891 [ch. 
383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795]." The 1891 Act, now codified at 25 
U. S. C. §397, allowed mineral leasing of"lands ... occupied 
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same, and which 
lands are not needed for farming or agricultural purposes, 
and are not desired for individual allotments." Thus, the 
proviso by its express terms applies to unallotted lands on In-
dian reservations "bought and paid for" by the Indians and 
not needed for agricultural purposes. 
The lands that the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938 
Act clearly fall within this description: they are unallotted 
*The majority frames the question as whether the 1938 Act "incorpo-
rates" the proviso to the 1924 Act. See ante, at 7. To me, the discussion 
of "incorporation" seems beside the point. The 1924 proviso remains on 
the books, and it covers leases of a certain description. The question is 
whether leases under the 1938 Act fit that description. If they do, a spe-
cific congressional intent to "incorporate" the proviso into the 1938 Act is 
unnecessary. 
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reservation lands not needed for agricultural purposes. 
Moreover, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board 
of Equalization of Montana, 299 U. S. 159 (1936), this Court 
held that the Blackfeet Reservation was "bought and paid 
for" within the meaning of the provis<>-that is, the reserva-
tion is the product of an agreement by which the Blackfeet 
gave up certain rights in exchange for the reservation. See 
id., at 162-164. Because the leases are located "on such 
lands" as are described by the 1924 proviso, I can only con-
clude that the taxation of oil and gas production under the 
leases is expressly authorized by the proviso and is therefore 
lawful. 
In so concluding, I am mindful of the general rule that stat-
utes are to be liberally construed in favor of Indian tribes. 
But more to the point, to my way of thinking, is the proposi-
tion that this rule is no more than a canon of construction, 
and "[a] canon of construction is not a license to disregard 
clear expressions of . . . congressional intent." Rice v. 
Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 733 (1983). The proviso to the 1924 
Act is a clear expression of congressional intent to allow the 
States to tax mineral production under leases of lands de-
scribed in the Act; the proviso has never been repealed; and 
the lands that the Blackfeet ,have leased under the 1938 Act 
fall within the proviso's description of lands on which mineral 
production is subject to taxation. 
Respondents suggest, and the majority seems to agree, see 
ante, at 7, n. 5, that this result is to be avoided because State 
taxation of mineral production on leaseholds created under 
the 1938 Act is somehow contrary to the "policy" of the 1938 
Act. The relevant policies seem to have been promoting uni-
formity in the law governing tribal authority to enter into 
mineral leases, preserving the independence of Indian tribes, 
and guaranteeing the tribes a fair return on properties leased 
for mineral production. But it is far from clear that Con-
gress saw State taxation of mineral production to be a threat 
to any of these goals; as the majority concedes, the legislative 
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history is barren of any indication that taxation by the States 
was one of the evils Congress sought to eradicate through the 
1938 Act. This omission is particularly striking given that at 
the time the statute was under consideration, this Court had 
just handed down its ruling in British-American Oil Co., 
supra, which held that production on leases located on res-
ervations created by treaty or legislation was subject to 
State taxation under the proviso to the 1924 Act. To me, the 
absence of any comment in the legislative history pertaining 
to State taxation confirms that we should give effect to the 
express language of the 1924 proviso authorizing the State 
taxes at issue here. 
Finally, I consider it relevant, though not dispositive, that 
the suggestion that the 1924 Act does not authorize taxation 
of production on 1938 Act leases is contrary to the interpreta-
tion of both acts that apparently prevailed in the Department 
of the Interior until 1977. Opinions issued by the Office or' 
the SQlicitor of the Interior in the years following the passage 
of the 1938 Act discussed the scope of State authority to tax 
under the proviso to the 1924 Act with no mention of the pos-
sibility that the 1938 Act had had any effect on such author-
ity. See 58 I. D. 535 (1943); Opinion of the Department of 
Interior, M-36246, Oct. 29, 1954, 2 Op. Solicitor of Dept. of 
Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974, p. 1652 (1979); 
Opinion of the Department of Interior, M-36310, Oct. 13, 
1955. In 1956, the Department issued an opinion explicitly 
concluding that the 1924 proviso applied to leases under the 
1938 Act, and the Department reaffirmed this position in 
1966. See Opinion of the Department of Interior, M-36345, 
May 4, 1956; Letter from Harry R. Anderson, Ass't. Secre-
tary of the Interior, Oct. 27, 1966, reprinted at App. to Pet. 
forCert. 301. Not until1977 did the Department change its 
view of the effect of the 1938 Act on the taxation authority 
contained in the proviso. This history admittedly does not 
conclusively establish what the Department's position was at 
the time of the passage of the 1938 Act and in the years im-
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mediately following. Still, it is significant that it was not 
until years after the passage of the 1938 Act that the Depart-
ment first suggested that the 1924 proviso's explicit authori-
zation of taxation did not extend to leases under the 1938 Act. 
Had Congress really intended to cut off the State's authority 
to tax mineral production on all leases entered into after 
1938, it would seem odd that no one in the Interior Depart-
ment was aware of this intention. 
Because the proviso to the 1924 Act explicitly authorizes 
State taxation of mineral production on "such lands" as are 
concerned in this case, and because nothing in the language of 
the 1938 Act, its legislative history, its underlying policies, or 
its administrative construction suggests that the express lan-
guage of the proviso should not govern this case, I would hold 
that the State taxes at issue here are authorized by federal 
law. 
I therefore dissent. 
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